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The July 1934 issue of Fortune magazine focused entirely on Italy, a country 
led at the time by the fascist Benito Mussolini. The articles covered topics ranging 
from Italy's economy to the fall from grace of its old aristocracy. But while the 
essays were often critical of the government and economy of Italy, the issue was 
far from an indictment of fascism. It was positive enough, in fact, for historian 
Robert Herzstein to generalize that Fortune had "lauded Mussolini as a decisive 
leader who had remade Italy." The mix of critical distance and admiration that 
characterized the issue appeared most clearly in the opening editorial comments, 
likely written by Fortune's founder and editor Henry Luce. The column tempered 
its sense that "no 100 percent journalist can be more than a few percent Fascist, 
which is to say, by definition, he is a non-Fascist" with the statement that "the 
good journalist must recognize in fascism certain ancient virtues of the race, 
whether or not they happen to be momentarily fashionable in his country: 
discipline, duty, courage, glory, sacrifice." Fortune combined a denial of fascist 
affiliation with a nostalgic embrace of the spirit of fascism. Even as the magazine 
refused to offer its full support to Italy, the editors pointed to its government as 
an exemplar of timeless values apparently "unfashionable" in the United States 
in 1934. Americans, they insisted, could learn something from Italy.1 
In the late twenties and thirties, Henry Luce was accused of harboring fascist 
tendencies. His accusers pointed primarily to the editorial practices of Fortune 
and its older sibling, Time. Time, a magazine notorious for its editorializing news 
copy, was particularly well-known in its support of Mussolini. As Herzstein 
notes, "When important issues were at stake, one knew where Time's editors 
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stood.... The magazine approved of Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, il 
Duce" Time's involvement with fascism was not limited to Italy, either. Time 
foreign correspondent Laird Goldsborough, for example, called supporters of 
Spanish fascist leader General Francisco Franco "... men of property, men of god 
and men of the sword." And while Luce was not nearly as vocal as Goldsborough, 
he did support his correspondent's writing even when it became a highly divisive 
staff issue at Time, Inc. But there was more to the accusations than just these 
editorial tendencies. Observers as disparate as Fortune writer Dwight Macdonald, 
Fortune managing editor Eric Hodgins, and biographer W.A. Swanberg have 
seen fascist leanings in Luce himself. Macdonald, referring to the anonymous 
corporate structure of Time, Inc., accused Luce in 1937 of "fascist capitalism." 
Hodgins, in his 1973 autobiography, recalled that Luce liked "the purported aims 
of fascism." And Swanberg claimed that Luce admired the dynamism, militarism, 
strong leadership, and anti-Communism of Mussolini's Italy. Clearly, Luce 
appeared to some of those familiar with him to be attached to certain fascist 
ideals.2 
But these accusations clash with a more common portrait of Luce. Henry 
Luce was a man famous for his Americanism and patriotism, and for his 
admiration for what in his 1941 essay "The American Century" he called "the 
great American ideals . . . a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of 
opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of coopera-
tion." He fervently supported the idea of competition, not only in the marketplace 
but in the realm of ideas as well. How could a man with such ideals be attracted 
to fascism, a form of government that systematically denied freedom and the 
importance of the individual?3 
In the interwar years, and particularly in the thirties, fascism was a real 
political option. Some critics, in fact, felt that either it or communism was an 
inevitability. This sense of the possibility of revolutionary change underlies this 
whole essay. Luce was fascinated by politics and admired much of the American 
governmental system, yet he was willing to consider and advocate what seem to 
us to be radical viewpoints. For instance, he argued in a 1928 article for the 
mainstream Saturday Review of Literature that "the system of government as set 
forth in the Constitution is fundamentally unsuited to modern America" (his 
italics), and that the Constitution itself was badly in need of replacement. Even 
if we read this as an imaginative exercise, as opposed to a serious policy proposal 
(a reading which is not entirely convincing), it reveals Luce's sense that 
fundamental changes might be made to the American political system. This 
openness to revolutionary political ideas was common in Fortune, too. Consider, 
for instance, the opening article of the Fortune issue on Italy, which asked its 
reader to "anesthetize for the moment the ingrained idea that democracy is the 
only right and just conception of government." I argue that Luce was attracted to 
fascism not to slander him, but to try to understand an attraction that sixty years 
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later doesn't seem quite possible, except in the most reactionary and radical of 
thinkers. In the interwar years, though, many of the beliefs that Luce professed 
were in the mainstream of business thought.4 
More particularly, this essay explores the seeming contradiction between 
Luce's attraction to fascism and his support of American democratic capitalism. 
Most critics have solved this dilemma by pointing to Luce's admiration of 
individual power and prestige. Luce, they say, was an "uncritical hero-worship-
per" (Macdonald's term) who delighted in the aura surrounding powerful 
individuals, and so often lost, at least initially, his critical edge in his dealings with 
them. But this answer, by dealing only with the personality of Luce, fails to 
recognize the deeper cultural sources of Luce's contradictions. The paradox of 
Luce's simultaneous attraction to both individualism and fascism derives not 
simply from "hero-worship," but from his ideas about the role of business in the 
United States.5 
The grandiose cover of Fortune's first issue in February 1930 suggested the 
scope of the magazine's mission (figure 1). A classical half-nude lounged in front 
of a giant wheel of fortune, which also seemed to function as the tiller of some 
landbound vessel. She gazed boldly into the future (signified by the source of 
light), and displayed with one hand a cornucopia full of fruit and grains (the 
products of labor). With her other hand this maiden of commerce reached back 
to spin the wheel, or, alternately, to guide the ship. A small angel perched upon 
the axle of the wheel, in a pose nearly identical to the larger figure, watching 
carefully over her movements. In the distance sat a mercantile port, full of activity 
and tall-masted ships; a number of unidentified, and in fact, faceless men built an 
unidentified structure, carried goods, and drove wagons, among other things. But 
the foreground took precedence. The double-meaning of the wheel mixed 
guidance with the vagaries of chance. Business was simultaneously represented 
as a game that combined luck with skill and as the blessed force that captained the 
unaware people in the background. The half-nude both played a game of fortune 
and determined the fortune of others (with "money" and "fate" resonating in each 
phrase). The cover drawing highlighted two strands of thought which drove 
Henry Luce and Fortune in the first years of the thirties. The first reading— 
business as game—pointed to Fortune's attempt to focus on the skill and glamour 
of industry. The second reading—business as captain—recalled Luce's desire to 
establish business as the acknowledged leading force in American society. 
But as the overdetermined symbolism of the cover hints, these two aims 
easily mesh neither with each other, nor with the economic and cultural reality of 
the early thirties. The conflicts and tensions inherent in Luce's ambitious goals 
would produce frustration and blindness in his dealings with "the masses"; his 
impatience with and disregard of these masses eventually encouraged a sentimen-
tal view of fascist politics. Luce saw the market as a competitive game in which 
young men could prove their mettle and join an "aristocracy of worth" based on 
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Figure 1: Cover of Fortune, Volume 1, Issue 1. © 1930 Time Inc. All 
rights reserved. 
business performance. Similarly, he felt that this managerial "aristocracy" 
deserved the mantle of leadership, because they knew best how to produce a 
rational, efficient, and modern economy and society. But his desire for a business 
"aristocracy of worth" led to a refusal to consider the effects of business 
competition on the masses, and his ambition for an efficient business leadership 
resulted in a frustration with those masses' lack of compliance to managerial 
control. This blindness and frustration opened Luce to a sympathy for the order 
and hierarchy of fascism. He supported individualistic ideals in regards to his own 
business, and yet still fantasized about fascistic control in regards to others' 
actions. The division of the United States into an "aristocracy of talent" and "the 
masses" provided the ground for a double standard that allowed Luce both to 
fiercely defend individualism and wistfully admire fascism. 
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The first important strand in Luce's thought—imagining business as a game 
played by expert managers—removed the masses from consideration. By con-
centrating on his effort to perfect his "art," the businessman could easily dismiss 
from his consciousness the real world effects of the economy.6 
At the center of Luce's conception of business as a game was his desire to 
establish a new aristocracy "of worth" in America. Talented young men in 
America, Luce complained, have no "dominant" motive in their life. Denied the 
honors of war or of meaningful government service, as well as the escape of the 
frontier, they were trapped in mediocrity and non-recognition. The one possible 
option for a young man in search of honor seemed to be business. As Luce argued 
in a speech in late 1930, "the aristocratic principle may be recreated in America 
through what has always marched under the nicely middle-class name of 
business." The key advantage of business in this regard was its dependence on 
competition: "There must be a top, and if possible, the best men must get there." 
The aim in this aristocratic scheme was not so much to make money, but to 
demonstrate your skill. In a complex industrial world that "tends to make ability 
more important than luck," the most talented would inevitably be given their due 
of honor. Luce even proposed that aristocratic businessmen needed a cheering 
crowd familiar with the ins and outs of the game: for the public glory of the new 
managers, the public must learn to "distinguish a little between a man's impor-
tance to business and the amount of money he gets out of business." Business 
should be conceived as a game of skill that separated the able from the mediocre.7 
But for the game to succeed, the players had to believe that the individual, and 
not personal circumstances, employees, or previous wealth, made the difference. 
For this reason, Fortune continually insisted that corporate heads were personally 
responsible for their companies ' success or failure. In his speeches concerning the 
new aristocracy, Luce worried that lone men no longer travelled into the 
wilderness to make their fortunes by their wits and strength. In a similar spirit, the 
flamboyant opening sentence of a Fortune article on copper magnate Daniel 
Cowan Jackling in April of 1930 recognized the passing of the Great American 
frontiersman: "The rampant, two-fisted heroes who whelped the American 
copper industry have rushed on to their stormy Valhalla." But this didn't mean the 
United States was lacking in heroes. While the times and necessary skills had 
changed, the character required for success remained the same. Laboratories had 
replaced pick-axes, perhaps, but as the article noted, "the man—the scientist on 
a giant scale—who created the laboratory that is test-tubing and abolishing a 
mountain is certainly a genius." Jackling was as much a pioneer as the roughest 
of the original miners. Referring to Jackling as "the Man of Vision," the article 
told the story of the hero's inevitable rise to wealth and power.8 
Even the relationship between the business "tycoon," as Time famously 
labeled heads of industry, and "his" products was deeply personal. The magazine 
gave credit for the success of the Utah Copper Company almost exclusively to 
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Jackling's management skills; note, for example, the caption under the astonish-
ing four-page fold-out color picture accompanying the article: "A Utah Copper 
mine whence Mr. Jackling and men have extracted $500,000,000 of copper." The 
tycoon's organizational and technological powers had replaced raw labor as the 
prime force in copper excavation. The opening line of an advertisement in 
Fortune for Eagle-A Papers further demonstrated this point: "They are his cars. 
No matter how many thousands have come off the assembly line—no matter how 
far away they have been sold—his cars still" (italics in the original). In order for 
the art of business to produce a true aristocracy, the tycoon must be the source of 
everything his company produced; the wealth of the corporation signified in full 
the talent and knowledge of the manager.9 
Fortune as a corporation served as the primary example of a successful 
competitor. The magazine provided an example of how a business should behave 
by actively insisting upon and competing for its own honor and glory. Calling the 
new magazine the "Aristocrat of Business," critics and admirers lauded it as a 
unique achievement in publishing. Businessman Owen Young thought the 
publication of Fortune portended a new era in which "the all-embracing term 
'business' may be drawing to itself the fine spirit of sportsmanship and the beauty 
of arts." The physically-plush and artistically-conceived magazine simulta-
neously proclaimed a new business era and its own predominance in that era. And 
behind the whole project seemed to be Henry Luce. The lack of by-lines for 
articles hid the diverse and talented writing staff from view, leaving Luce as the 
only identifiable force behind the magazine. Even the hostile Walcott Gibbs 
wrote in 1936 (this time about Life), "Behind this latest, most incomprehensible 
Timenterprise looms, as usual, ambitious, gimlet-eyed Baby Tycoon Henry 
Robinson Luce." Fortune stood as a model for the glamorous, tycoon-controlled 
corporation that it constantly lauded.10 
The oddity of using a magazine as a model for industrial organization, 
though, signals one of the key tensions within Luce's ideas about business. Just 
as the "scientist on a giant scale" was replacing the American frontiersman as the 
ideal capitalist, companies focusing on communications, service, and finance 
were gaining on and surpassing industry as the primary forces in the United States 
economy. Richard Ohmann in his Selling Culture looks to the historians Robert 
Wiebe, Gabriel Kolko, and Martin Sklar to argue that in response to the financial 
crises of the 1890s, American industrial leaders began to fear the very competi-
tion that had brought them wealth and power. The constant swings between 
depression and boom left them vulnerable to sudden losses, and fierce competi-
tion was shrinking their profit margins. As a result, many of them joined with the 
professional-managerial class in what Sklar called the "anti-competitive consen-
sus." Industry increased its involvement in legislation and politics in order to 
protect gains and fight for stability. The talents of the professional-managerial 
class—of which Luce was most certainly a member—were newly valuable to an 
industry in need of legal, political, and managerial advice. In fact, as Fortune 
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often pointed out, the new "tycoons" were most often not the owners of the 
companies but rather salaried managers. Such a significant shift in the economy 
surely created a different vision of the ideal "tycoon": how, then, is Luce's model 
of the industrial leader different from that of a Gilded Age capitalist?11 
The surprise, though, is that the model changed very little. Luce was 
unwilling to come to terms with the implications of the profound shift away from 
laissez faire economics, and seemed at times to pretend that it hadn't happened. 
On the cover of the first issue of Fortune, the port in the background was clearly 
not of the twentieth century. The tall-masted ships and horses and wagons placed 
the scene in the early industrial revolution or earlier, and certainly before what 
Kolko called "political capitalism." The article on Jackling, too, made a too easy 
equation between the "two-fisted" pioneers of early capitalism and the managers 
and scientists of monopoly capitalism. Since Luce imagined his aristocracy of 
worth succeeding in a world created by competition rather than by legislative 
control and political influence, to acknowledge the stabilizing and "anti-competi-
tive" effects of political capitalism would be to forgo the level-playing field so 
important to his conception of business and aristocracy. Luce had to selectively 
ignore the change from an economy ruled by fierce competition and industrial 
magnates to one regulated by government, unions, and managerial expertise— 
the very change that made possible Luce's rise to power as a editor and corporate 
manager, and in fact the very change that Fortune regularly celebrated and pushed 
forward—in order to retain his vision of businessmen competing for honor and 
awards. Luce's model of an industrial leader varied little from a Gilded Age ideal 
because Luce couldn't forgo his Carnegie-like belief in a "level-playing field" 
without canceling the meaning of the business "game." 
The tycoon expressed talent and worth through his manipulation and mastery 
over an ever-coursing progress. His awards came in the form of public honor and 
money. His fairly gained victory over the other competitors in the field gave him 
standing, his "worth" deserved. Unfortunately, as I will show, this conception of 
the tycoon relegated "the masses" to non-existence: everyone existed only in his 
capacity as a businessman. Imagining business as a game left the player to achieve 
results solely in terms of his own honor. No one was affected by the actions of the 
aristocratic businessman except himself. The political importance of this cloak-
ing of social responsibility can be explained in the context of Susan Buck-Morss ' 
article "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics." Buck-Morss argues that as anaesthetics 
made the act of surgery less painful for both the patient and surgeon, surgeons 
began to imagine the body as a site for their own achievements. The screaming 
and thrashing that might have accompanied an earlier surgery were replaced by 
the calm of the anaesthetized patient. She cites one account of an amputation 
under general anaesthesia that ends with a surgeon's formal bow to his enthusi-
astic audience. The patient had become the hyle: the unseen matter upon which 
some other significant action takes place. The surgery seemed to be performed 
122 Michael Augspurger 
only as a representation of technique and a demonstration of skill. The supposed 
beneficiary disappeared from consideration.12 
Luce's philosophy presented a metaphor with important similarities to Buck-
Morss' surgery. The businessman played his game in order to gain honor for 
himself; the original purpose of industry—the production of goods for use and 
sale—fell, like the patient's welfare (and limb) in the amputation, by the wayside. 
Like the surgeon, the tycoon acted in a setting that disregarded the consequences 
of the actions upon the hyle, which in the case of the businessman was actually 
the masses (as opposed to the metaphorical "social body" in Buck-Morss). The 
identification of business with a game of skill moved the stress away from the 
production of goods in a world full of workers and consumers toward a special-
ized arena wherein the tycoon attempted before a knowledgeable but admiring 
crowd (Luce's ideal public) to master "the economy." 
Groups of people ceased to matter in the game of business. According to 
biographer W.A. Swanberg, Luce felt that "the poor were simply the most 
inefficient members of society." In the game of business, they were simply 
players who were not succeeding. Luce was born in China to missionary parents 
in the late-nineteenth century. Swanberg argues that growing up as an elite in a 
setting overwhelmed with poverty ironically caused Luce to lose any sympathy 
for their plight: "to function efficiently, missionaries felt they had to steel 
themselves against excess sympathy." The constant shock of human deprivation 
forced Luce to build a defensive shield that made consideration of the plight of 
lower classes inconceivable to him. With the masses blocked from view, the 
economy became a site of individual competition. Dwight Macdonald com-
plained in 1937 that Fortune was more interested in technology than in sociology: 
"Machines and balance sheets are... more 'exciting' (a favorite word at Fortune) 
than social data." This need for "excitement" points directly to the magazine's 
tendency to pass over the condition of groups of people for evidence of individual 
gamesmanship. As Luce confessed to Macdonald, "People just aren't interesting 
in the mass. . . . It's only individuals who are exciting."13 
Luce recognized individual members of the public, but he resisted thinking 
of a group or mass as significant. Another comparison to Buck-Morss' article will 
help clarify this point. She sets up a trilogy of positions that arose in the modern 
era: agent, hyle (or object), and observer. Fascism, she argues, makes the masses 
believe that they are both the hyle and the observer; in this way, they can enjoy 
the spectacle (as observers) of their own destruction (as hyle). But in the scheme 
of Luce's game, the masses were everything but the hyle: as a knowledgeable 
public, they watched and applauded (as observer), while at the same time aiming 
to break onto the field (as agent). There is no recognized hyle when business is 
a game; the money earned might as well be imaginary. Of course, millions of 
people are affected by the moves of large corporations and by the health of the 
economy, but because individual performance is the key to the game, the plight 
of individuals (as hyle) affected by an economy beyond their control is of no 
concern. The knowledgeable public should ignore the wood (even if it is 
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themselves) out of which the businessman artist carves his visionary corporation. 
Luce disregarded social harm because the game allowed him to avoid 
acknowledgement of its basis in real situations.14 
This lack of connection between "the economy" (as the site for the game) and 
the condition of groups of workers was expressed in a Business Week editorial 
written weeks after the Crash: 
The trouble at this moment is not with business but with 
businessmen. They are still trying to translate their stock 
averages, paper gains and losses and shrunken private check 
books into terms of fewer automobiles, radios, cigar 
lighters . . . for the hundred odd million who merely read 
about the panic in the evening paper and went to bed to go to 
work in the morning. 
The argument here was not that the businessman should not be worried about 
money; rather, it was that the economy was so regular and strong, as seen in its 
ability to provide regularly for the worker, that only panic by businessmen could 
create a real problem. The regular and dependable lives of the worker became the 
given evidence of the overall stability of a game ultimately based upon those lives, 
but flightily unattached to them. This argument that the Crash existed only on 
paper continued for years into the Depression; only after piles of evidence of 
poverty had accumulated did the business press recognize the human tragedy of 
the Depression.15 
The results of Luce's and Fortune's ideas—in short, their unwillingness to 
see real world effects of the business game—also manifested itself in the style of 
Fortune. I will briefly indicate hov^ Fortune's parallel of the tycoon and the artist 
encouraged the elision of the effects of the economy on people other than the 
business "players." Luce decided early in the process of creating Fortune that he 
wanted to make extravagant use of the photograph, and to insist that both 
photography and the subject of Fortune photography were deserving of artistic 
attention. Fortune's editors had no intention of continuing the tradition of 
photographs of important individuals established by Time and other news 
magazines. Everyday products or factories were to be captured with an artistic 
eye. Luce quickly hired Margaret Bourke-White, whose stylized pictures of 
Soviet industry were perhaps the most well-known "art" photographs in the 
United States at the time, and gave her an artistic freedom unknown to the staff 
writers. The magazine even occasionally presented "portfolios" of photogra-
phers, reproducing six or more full-page black and white images on a theme 
unrelated to other articles. 
The importance of this stress on photography lies in the parallel proposed by 
Fortune between the photographer and the tycoon. In photographers' fight for the 
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right to call their work artistic, Luce recognized an analogy to his own aims. In 
the twenties and early thirties, both photographers and tycoons were fighting to 
have their creations judged as art; each argued that the photograph or the 
corporation was an expression of individual talent. Just as photographers like 
Walker Evans (a Fortune staff member in the thirties) aggrandized personal 
vision over luck or the subject of the photo, Luce insisted that the tycoon had 
control of his surroundings. And if Evans' one-man show at the Museum of 
Modern Art in 1938 announced the arrival of photography as a true "art," Fortune 
tried to do the same for business in 1930. Recognizing this parallel, Fortune 
proclaimed the artistic authority of the photographer in its pages. In April 1930, 
the magazine published a portfolio of aerial photographs by Captain Alfred G. 
Buckham. While the aerial picture was a common trope in Fortune stories and 
advertisements, the remarkable characteristic of these photographs was that in 
each one evidence of the airplane appears, either in the form of the wing tip on the 
edge of the frame or of another plane. By printing these five photographs, the 
magazine foregrounded the individual artistic act that created the pictures, which 
the magazine claimed were "without equal, artistic or technical." In addition to 
individual photographs, Fortune's treatment of writers and visual artists shows 
its support of the artistic legitimacy of photography. The writing staff, as Luce 
stressed, was an "objective," fact-gathering, cooperative group, and so did not 
receive bylines. Photographers, though, as prototypes of the creative, controlling 
tycoon, always received credit. Fortune reversed the conventional wisdom by 
insisting that the written word could be depersonalized (and so "objective"), but 
that the photographic image was inseparable from its creator. By encouraging the 
artistic fetish with personal vision and genius in photography, Luce thought to 
give credence to his own sense of the businessperson's role.16 
While Fortune's treatment of photographers provided support to the idea of 
a creative, independent businessperson, the visual aesthetic utilized in Fortune 
worked to hide the effects of the economy on the masses. The magazine 
attempted, in the words of one review, to treat "industrial subjects with a wealth 
of artistic photographs and fine printing, precisely as if they were some precious 
artistic theme." This presentation of industry as a "precious artistic theme" 
encouraged a "high" art obsession with artistic form, and its aggrandization of the 
artists' "vision" over the subject of the art. By stressing form over content in its 
art, Fortune again implied that the creator (Buck-Morss' agent) was more 
important than the object out of which the work was made (hyle). But while this 
may be suitable for "high" art, its effect in the realm of business was less 
desirable.17 
One way in which Fortune photography backgrounded the masses was 
through its constant use of repetition. In its desire to print "artistic" photography, 
Fortune's editors were willing to experiment widely with abstraction. But a 
concentration on form could make the content almost irrelevant, as revealed 
perhaps by the occasional difficulty of caption writers to explain the presence of 
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the picture in a news story (one caption under a stylized Bourke-White photo read 
"What a derrick looks like from the bottom up")- The focus on form could also 
create a disturbing defamiliarization of the content, and the constant use of 
repetition in Fortune pictures made this even more drastic: note, for example, the 
photo of hanging slaughtered pigs (figure 2). The organized and planned 
atmosphere of the factory encouraged a treatment of repetition; everything from 
croquet balls to stacked wood to rows of buildings were photographed (often at 
a diagonal that recedes to the edge of the photo) as a study in the repeated form. 
The dissonance between form and content is perhaps shown best by a bizarre 
review of the first issue: "Sumptuous to the point of rivaling the pearly gates— 
with its photographs, its almost lyric elaboration of the detailed process of 
'disassembling' the hog, it goes Carl Sandberg one better in poeticizing the stock 
yards of Chicago." The euphemism of "disassembling" is doubled with an 
admiration of the "almost lyric" photographs of pig corpses and huge mounds of 
dust from waste pig parts, in a review that notices but refuses to acknowledge the 
gruesome content of the story. But the subjects of these photographs were not 
always factory machines, or even slaughtered pigs. The same process of 
defamiliarization through repetition happens in a picture of workers, who, 
faceless, are required to maintain the order of a row of machines (figure 3). But 
whatever the content, the subjects in these repetitive photos become defamiliarized 
shapes in an artistic composition. Form (the production of an artist/agent) takes 
precedence over content (the hyle). The mass once again retreats from view.18 
II 
As intimated on the cover of the first issue of Fortune, Luce's vision of 
business as a game forced the individual and daily lives of the masses into the 
background and encouraged the businessman to act with only his own aims (and 
not those of the social collective) in mind. The second half of Luce's attitude 
toward business—the desire to guide and manage the economy as a whole—on 
the other hand, recognized the existence of the masses. But the creation of a 
rational and efficient economy through managerial leadership required that the 
great majority of citizens accept the wisdom and leadership of the managerial 
elite. Thus, the aspiration to guide the economy encouraged an attempt to unify 
and control the masses, purportedly for their own good. This desire for a unified 
masses inevitably failed, but the planning businessman was still often unable to 
accept the inefficiency of a diverse society. The failure of attempts to control the 
masses led to frustration with decentralized or democratic power that helps to 
explain Luce's attraction to Italian fascism. 
The ubiquity of the crowd was a defining characteristic of modernity. In 
1937, Henry Luce appeared in front of the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and argued that advertisers 
and journalists must do more than "give the public what it wants." Instead, they 
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Figure 2: Defamiliarizing through repetition. Photograph taken by Marga-
ret Bourke-White for article on Swift and Company entitled "Tsaa-a Tsaa-
a Tsaa-a," in the February 1930 issue of Fortune. Reproduced by permis-
sion of the estate of Margaret Bourke-White. 
Figure 3: Repetition applied to the worker. Photograph taken by Arthur 
Gerlach for an article on the Biltmore Hotel, "Biltmore," in the February 
1930 issue of Fortune. 
Henry Luce, Fortune 127 
need to consider their ethical responsibility as controllers of public opinion. They 
must, in Luce's words, 
. . . face the great new physical reality in society—crowds. Not 
merely Hitler's crowds, or Mussolini's, or Stalin's, or Hirohito' s, 
but the crowds on American beaches, the crowds in movies— 
the even vaster crowds you advertisers yearn for—mass circu-
lation. 
The crowd, Luce believed, threatened modern democratic society in its physical-
ness, in its depersonalization, and in its tendency to release the irrational, and, he 
warned, American crowds are no less powerful or uncontrollable than those of 
Europe. The uncontrolled crowd endangered the comfort and progress of modern 
society. As Luce asked in the same speech, "Can the masses save themselves from 
the barbarous dominion of the mass mind? If you have complete, unqualified, 
irrational faith in the common man in the new revolutionary world, then you will 
believe in giving the public what it wants." According to Luce, expert planners 
had to guide the masses around the dangers of demagoguery. The public could not 
be trusted with its own thoughts.19 
This recognition of the irrationality of the crowd was especially disconcert-
ing to the businessman. For Fortune, the uncontrollability of the crowd threatened 
business in three different forms: consumers, labor, and "money-grubbing" 
businessmen. The first was perhaps the most disconcerting. As the economy 
gradually switched from a producer-driven machine to a consumer-centered 
marketplace, businesses started to realize that their success depended upon a force 
over which they had little rational control. This anxiety at the power of the buyer 
manifested itself in, among other places, advertiser's characterization of the 
masses as feminine. The culturally-stereotyped female—irrational, whimsical, 
and flighty—was a nightmare to a seller of products, and commentors speculated 
that a vast majority of household purchases were made by females. In one 
advertisement in Fortune, for the Charles Daniel Frey Company, businessmen 
readers were shown the back of a classically-drawn female figure, and told that 
their livelihood lay "In the Hollow of Her Hand" (figure 4). This dependence on 
irrational forces was difficult to accept for business; classically-inclined or not, 
the businessmen were unwilling to give up their Fate to a fickle woman.20 
Fortune focused on the fashion industry as a metaphor for this uncontrollable 
social body. More than any other business sector, the women's garment industry 
was at the mercy of consumers' flighty trends. An unanticipated turn in desires 
of women could easily destroy a business. Attempts to control fashion met with 
little success, according to Fortune. Two different articles from 1930, "Model 
Women" and "Cloak and Suit," insisted that women, not courtiers, created and 
controlled trends. But this lack of central authority did more than injure individual 
businesses: it kept the industry as a whole from achieving efficiency and 
economic rationality. "Cloak and Suit" argued that the industry would never truly 
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: . DEE is 16; she is 30; she is 65 . She sells eggs in the country, notions in a 
department store, bonds onWall Street. She is a graduate of the fourth grade, high school, or occa-
. siônallySmith..She wears $15 frocks, home-sewn dresses, Chanel gowns. She is a drudge, a hoyden, 
a help-mate, a lady; she is thé aggregate American woman . . . and; in her various ways, she is the 
- spender of the nation. Deciding how the bulk of her family's money shall be divided, she controls the 
profits of many manufacturers. Extravagant, frugal; wise, foolish; fickle, dependable; she holds your 
bu8inëss,ih all likelihood, in the hollow of her hand The successful advertising of many of our 
ctientstalksawoman's language: colorinkitchens and bathrooms forCiane Hmiming;mterior decora-
tionforKar^nFurniture; smartness for Marshall Field and Company, Retail; home moviesfor Filmo 
Camera^fright attractive jackets for Capitol Boilers; and even Wilson Brothers advertising, directed 
tomen,lksjinyàf^lyuivitàlwomen,who buy 65%of men's haberdashery, to read between the lines. 
'* C H A R r a l ^ ^ A I W E t o l è ï N ( & ^ G È N ê Y 
333Nor£MkJ^an Menue,Chicago'..... Magazine, Newspaper, Outdoor,Radio,DirectMcriL 
Figure 4: Fear of the female consumer's power. Advertisement for the 
Charles Daniel Grey advertisement agency in the February 1930 issue of 
Fortune. 
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be modernized until "MiLady" stopped feeling that "a dress is worthless once she 
has seen its duplicate." Using the language of evolution to describe industrial 
progress, the author suggested that the flighty "MiLady" had made the "fourth 
largest industry" in the United States not even a business "dinosaur," but a 
"protozoan colony." While the men's fashion industry had "followed a course 
more parallel to that of other industries," irrational women consumers had kept 
the women's garment industry inefficient and archaic. "Model Women," on the 
other hand, compared the rule of women consumers to the political ruptures of 
unsteady governments. Suggesting that the fluidity of fashion undermined any 
long-term stability, the author declared that while one fashion "revolution" had 
ended, a "new regime" of fashion guidelines had been ushered in. In the unruly 
state of the women's garment trade, the businessman had no more control over 
his fortunes and his money than a businessman faced with serious political unrest. 
Fortune's essays on women's fashion warned that the growing power of women 
consumers threatened the stability and progress of modern business.21 
The task for business, then, was to guide the consumer market, and to control 
its eccentricities; if the seller could sculpt the desires of the consumer to his needs, 
his anxieties would be calmed. The best means to this end seemed to be 
advertising, and the businessman quickly learned to look to the advertising 
industry to ease his fears of sudden market disruption. Advertisers catered to 
business anxiety by claiming to leave little to chance: scientific research could 
make advertising a "reliable sales medium." Advertisers put their faith in their 
ability to predict the behavior of the masses and asserted that old methods were 
no longer acceptable. "The impulsive use of untried intuitive ideas," as one ad put 
it, or "Guessing," as another more straight-forward competitor wrote, were no 
longer professional tools. Like the science-minded social planner, the advertiser 
saw the possibility of efficiency and stability in amove toward professionalized, 
expert control. The scientific rhetoric of advertising, combined with most 
advertising men's contempt for the "weak-kneed conformity" of the consumer, 
produced a phenomenal sense of the power of the advertisement. The business-
man was encouraged by professionalized advertising industry to hope that the 
emotional consumer crowd could be controlled.22 
But the crowd manifested itself in forms other than the woman consumer. 
Fortune feared the power of labor as well. "Cloak and Suit" opened with the 
subtitle, "The country's fourth largest industry is at the mercy of two forces— 
labor and a woman's vanity. Together they keep it without leadership and without 
stability." The article paired the woman consumer with the more traditional 
opponent of capital—labor—and connected them both to market instability and 
irrationality. Interestingly, Fortune generally supported the existence of trade 
unions, and praised their ability to stabilize markets and raise standards of living. 
In "Cloak and Suit," even, the author noted that the larger, more established 
garment businesses cooperated with labor because unions tended to drive cheap 
competitors out of business. "A Burlesque Tyrant" in November 1930 noted that 
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"no one, even the most old-fashioned of employers, would deny Labor's right to 
organize nor deny that often Labor's only bulwark against exploitation has been 
the union." 
But any attempt by labor to lead was dismissed by Fortune with the same mix 
of sarcasm and anxiety that "Model Women" mocked the "new regime" of 
women consumers. "A Burlesque Tyrant," the headline declared, "is Labor when 
it ascends to the throne." The piece strung together examples of "tyrannical" and 
"absurd" union practices that limited production and wasted time, and declared 
the ridiculousness of labor's claims to leadership. Just as Luce recognized the 
talent of his staff while limiting its power and individual recognition through 
anonymity and collaboration, Fortune supported labor's right to organize but 
insisted that it not attempt to influence business matters. While Fortune business-
men saw advertising as the answer to consumer power, the irrationality of labor 
could be controlled simply by keeping it away from the "throne."23 
Unfortunately, even if consumers and labor could be brought under control, 
the business community would still struggle to control its own members. Every 
businessman who claimed to support honest and mutually beneficial planning 
seemed to have an evil, irrational, and selfish other half. In fact, this "irrationality" 
arose at least in part from the competitive nature of capitalism. In his New Deals: 
Business, Labor, and Politics, 1920-1935, Colin Gordon argued that the New 
Deal came about primarily because businessmen became so frustrated with 
competitive practice that they turned to the government as a regulating institution. 
He pointed out that competition did not produce efficiency: "Although economic 
competition is driven by rational self-interest, it fails to yield rational outcomes. 
... [As a result], business interests routinely seek private or political organizations 
as an escape from its effects." Industry in the United States, because of its loose 
organization and cultural investment in competition, has proven particularly 
difficult to stabilize for any length of time. Business has repeatedly refused the 
constraint of outside control through unions or government (except for a small 
period during the New Deal, as Gordon argued) in favor of difficult-to-enforce 
internal agreements.24 
Fortune tried to convince businessmen to abide by just such an internal 
agreement. The magazine stridently agreed that, as the above Business Week 
editorial scolded, "the trouble at the moment is not with business but with the 
businessmen." Fortune considered the unification of the business world to be 
among its chief duties. In its founding statement, Luce made the distinction 
between "the gentleman and the money-grubber" in an attempt to create a 
business culture that refused to take part in the "irrational," selfish, and cut-throat 
competition that upset markets and lowered all competitors' profit margins. As 
a 1930 essay argued, competition could be a "deadly vice" if it was engaged in 
by "the wrong kind of persons." The same article expressed a fear of "legislative 
authority" if such speculative activity was not controlled internally. An article in 
March 1930 on advertising ethics acknowledged the effectiveness of "tasteless" 
advertising, but it eventually asserted that "when everything [has been said], one 
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feels that the element of good taste cannot be so disregarded without a result 
which is on the whole regrettable." Ungentlemanly behavior may provide 
momentary gains, but in the end the whole business community suffers. Even the 
format of Fortune—its artistic photographs and lush color reprints, its engaging 
writing and top-rate investigative journalism, its expensive paper, impressive 
size, and prohibitive one dollar cover price—suggested a "classiness" that 
dismissed "renegade" business behavior as not worthy of a "gentleman." By 
promoting a business culture in which the businessmen acted like "gentlemen," 
in their appreciation of fine arts, their refusal to engage in anti-productive 
competition, and their deference to managerial expertise, the magazine hoped to 
control the rampant speculation and greediness that sullied the reputation of the 
businessman but, more important, destroyed the stability of the market. Just as the 
businessman attempted to unify and rationalize his market through advertising, 
Fortune tried to consolidate and control the actions of renegade speculators by 
"selling" the businessman on the intelligence and profit of playing like a 
"gentleman."25 
Fortune businessmen tried to unify all three of these manifestations of the 
crowd—women consumers, labor, and "money-grubbing" businessmen—into a 
body controlled by a managerial head, whether in the form of advertisers, trade 
union-friendly business leaders, or Fortune's community of business gentlemen. 
In each case, Fortune wanted to retain the productive power of the members of 
the crowd without letting the individual members get beyond the control of 
"rational" managers. Unfortunately, this desire of Luce and Fortune for control 
stood little chance of success in a democratic nation with a capitalist market, and 
its almost inevitable failure pushed Luce towards a frustration with the "proto-
zoan" organization of decentralized competition. Mussolini's Italy offered an 
alternative to the uncontrolled irrationality of the United States' crowds. 
Jose Ortega y Gasset's The Revolt of the Masses, a. book from which Luce 
often quoted in the thirties, can help us understand how Luce's frustration with 
the masses drew him toward Mussolini and fascism. Ortega y Gasset, a Spanish 
parliamentarian and anti-fascist intellectual, expressed the need for a strong 
national purpose in which all citizens felt invested. Luce felt this sense of purpose 
was also missing from American culture. As we saw earlier, Luce heralded 
business as a new "dominant" motivation because he felt the United States offered 
its young men no worthy challenges to provide them honor or passion. But the 
antagonism that many United States citizens felt towards business meant it stood 
little chance of replacing war or the frontier as a true national ambition for the 
country. Even as Luce praised business, he recognized that business could only 
motivate a limited sector of the country, and he continued to look for a more 
convincing, inclusive motivation. 
Just as Luce bemoaned the loss of the frontier as a site for young men to earn 
honor, Ortega y Gasset blamed the listlessness and violence of Europe in the 
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twenties on the lack of a suitable "programme of human activity." He opened The 
Revolt of the Masses by asserting that the primary problem of modern Europe was 
the "accession of the masses to complete social power," and argued that this was 
a major crisis, "since, by definition, the masses neither should nor can direct their 
own personal experience, and still less rule society in general." Because the 
masses had no ability to rule, modern European nations were left without the 
direction that strong, trained leadership provided. Without this direction, Ortega 
y Gasset argued that the modern nation state would eventually collapse. The 
solution was in the creation of a "gigantic continental State" in Europe. By 
forming a new State, he argued, the "select minorities" of Europe could give 
themselves and the masses a new object for living and end the drift inevitable 
under the rule of the masses.26 
This new object for living would also provide a new moral code that would 
unify the continent in its "submission" to a higher goal. Ortega y Gasset insisted 
that individuals need a higher purpose to which they could submit themselves if 
they were going to be strong, moral people. The masses had lost sight of this need. 
They had finally taken to heart the revolutionary liberal sense that all men are 
sovereign, but without understanding that the rights of man come with responsi-
bilities. Liberalism, for Ortega y Gasset, required that the "individual bind 
himself to maintain a severe discipline over himself," but the masses had failed 
to recognize the "discipline" concomitant with "sovereignty." In reaction to this, 
Ortega y Gasset praised the lost value of "submission." Submission, he said, 
required service to some higher moral standard, and this recognition was what 
separated the "aristocrat" of talent from the mass man.27 
In the formation of a European state, Ortega y Gasset saw the common 
purpose that would convince the masses to "submit." In such a project, "each 
individual felt himself an active subject of the State, a participator and a 
collaborator." But the "participation" of the masses clearly had its limits. Since 
Ortega y Gasset made a clear division between those who should lead and those 
who should follow, "submission" had two different meanings. While the "aristo-
cratic" leaders needed to submit to a moral code, the followers were left to submit 
to the leaders. Because of this double meaning, the European state promised a 
vigorous sense of direction while returning power to a elite group of managers.28 
It is not difficult to see why Ortega y Gasset's ideas were attractive to Luce. 
In Ortega y Gasset's belief that a new "programme of human activity" could 
contain the masses and allow a talented leadership to act unhindered by the 
masses' irrationality, Luce imagined ways to unify and control the behavior of the 
crowd: the women consumers, labor forces, and "money-grubbing" businessmen 
who made the marketplace so unstable. Just as Ortega y Gasset's "selected 
minority" followed a "higher moral code" but expected the masses to follow the 
minority, Luce's "aristocracy of businessmen" considered themselves beholden 
to the code of "gentlemen" but felt the consumers and labor should fall into place 
behind them. Just as Ortega y Gasset imagined the creation of a European state 
Henry Luce, Fortune 133 
as a moral and honorable cause, Luce looked to business to provide opportunity 
for glory and ambition. And just as Ortega y Gasset insisted that the masses—"by 
definition"—could not rule themselves, and so civilization as a whole benefitted 
when they submitted to the trained and talented "select minority," Luce and 
Fortune argued that modernization and progress would be served if the crowd 
would allow the managers—those who have suffered a "careful education and 
rigorous apprenticeship," in the words of Luce—to create an efficient, rational 
business market.29 
Luce agreed with the anti-fascist Ortega y Gasset that the world, ruled now 
by the masses, was missing an important sense of a higher national purpose and 
a strong moral code. Ironically, Luce found a solution to these problems in Italian 
fascism. In 1928, Luce told a group of businessmen that Mussolini provided a 
positive example of what America needed: 
America needs at this moment a moral leader, a national leader. 
The outstanding national moral leader in the world today is 
Mussolini. And I say this, heartily disagreeing with nearly all 
of his moral principles. Fact remains, he has pulled his country 
up by the pants; he has made Italy stand up, he has substituted 
self-respect for vanity, patriotism for greed, ambition for 
boredom. He has made the nation stand up, stand up. That is 
what a great moral leader does. 
By giving his countrymen an example to live up to—even if that example was 
disagreeable—Mussolini had returned honor to his nation. By providing strong, 
inspirational leadership, he had inspired Italy to recover its self-respect and begin 
to act as a unified nation. The value of fascism, for Luce, was its ability to return 
a country to the discipline, participation, and collective action that Ortega y 
Gasset described as part of the nation-building process. Mussolini offered a 
model of the type of leadership that could ensure the order, hierarchy, and national 
purpose that the United States—especially its business—needed to function at its 
highest levels of efficiency. Italy ' s fascism exhibited the national unity and sense 
of purpose that Luce felt was missing from the economy and culture of the United 
States. 
In addition, Italian fascism had revived the value of "submission," and 
provided the "aristocracy" with an arena in which they could excel and gain glory. 
Of the five "ancient virtues" that Fortune's editors believed we "must recognize" 
in fascism, three (discipline, duty, sacrifice) directly reject individual needs in 
favor of the welfare and honor of community: they are, essentially, the values of 
Ortega y Gasset's "submission." In the United States, where such "virtues" were 
"unfashionable," the crowds of consumers, laborers, and businessmen could 
upset the modernization of society, but in Italy, Luce believed, that would not 
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happen. The other two "virtues" (glory and courage) refer to the ability of talented 
individuals to distinguish themselves in ways that the mundane and bureaucratic 
United States (for Luce) and a listless Europe (for Ortega y Gasset) had left 
behind. They are the values of ambition, and especially with their connotations 
of war, of national achievement. 
But how does Luce's agreement with the anti-fascist Ortega y Gasset 
harmonize with his admiration of Italy ' s fascism? The answer lies in the way Luce 
and Ortega y Gasset understood fascism, and particularly that of Mussolini. 
Ortega y Gasset understood Italy to be "the revolt of the masses" against the true 
leaders of Europe. In arguing that fascism was a "typical movement of mass-
men," he asserted that "Mussolini found a State admirably built up—not by him, 
but precisely by the ideas and forces he is combatting: by liberal democracy." The 
tragedy of Italy was that mass men had misidentified the forces that had made the 
country more productive and modern. Ortega y Gasset claimed that this error 
would inevitably lead to the nation's collapse. Luce, on the other hand, admired 
the leadership abilities of Mussolini. Where Ortega y Gasset saw chaos and 
directionlessness, Luce saw order, unity, and moral purpose. Ortega y Gasset 
argued that the modern progressive State was defined by its "plan of common life 
with an enterprise in common. . . . [and] the adhesion of men to that attractive 
purpose," and that these components are exactly what were missing in govern-
ments under mass rule. But Luce, in the above quote, suggested almost the 
opposite: Mussolini "has made Italy stand up. He has substituted . . . patriotism 
for greed, ambition for boredom. . . . That is what a great moral leader does." 
Mussolini had provided the "enterprise in common." In doing so, he had both 
controlled the crowd, by replacing the selfish "greed" of speculation and 
ungentlemanly competition with the collective commitment of "patriotism," and 
he had inspired the talented, by providing an object for "ambition" and a path for 
glory. As he argued in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in 1934, "The more you examine 
Italian Fascism, the more you will feel that it is not so much a system as it is a moral 
force The moral force of Fascism may be the inspiration for the next general 
march of mankind' (italics mine). For Luce, Mussolini was doing exactly what 
Ortega y Gasset wanted the true "aristocracy" of Europe to do: provide an object 
of living that would inspire the crowds to give up their aspirations to power and 
unify themselves behind the leadership of a trained "select minority."30 
Ill 
In "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics," Susan Buck-Morss quotes the Nazi Joseph 
Goebbels: "we are artistic people, entrusted with the great responsibility of 
forming out of raw material of the masses a solid, well-wrought structure." 
Throughout this essay, I have been exploring how Luce saw himself in a similar 
(if much less horrible) role, and how this conception of himself and business 
managers in general led him to admire certain facets of fascist government. But 
the sense that the masses were "raw material," or hyle, for some larger project, 
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combined with a belief that trained managers were best equipped to control and 
build the "well-wrought structure" of the United States economy and government 
frustrated Luce: democracy, capitalism, and perhaps just humanity were too 
complex for even an expansive "artistic" vision to contain. Nonetheless, his 
admiration for Mussolini did have certain effects on his behavior as a business-
man and political actor. In this last section, I will show how Luce's attraction to 
aspects of fascism manifested itself both in the authoritarian organization of his 
corporation and an attraction to the "ancient virtues" of war.31 
"A nation without an aristocracy," Henry Luce proclaimed in 1930, "is a 
nation all belly and no head." Luce's desire to be that head showed itself most 
obviously in the organization of Time, Inc. As Dwight Macdonald noted, Luce 
desired a corporation that would be an extension of Luce himself: 
Luce's idea, roughly, is that the corporation accepts responsi-
bility for the general economic and social well-being of its 
employees In return, the employee identifies his own future 
with that of the corporation, centering all personal ambitions 
therein and thinking of it as "my" rather that "their" corpora-
tion—though, of course, not taking this too literally in the 
matter of dividends. 
By convincing his workers to identify with the corporation instead of with 
themselves, Luce hoped to solve the problem of organizational inefficiency and 
unpredictability. The corporation, like Ortega y Gasset's nation, would allow 
each worker to feel himself "an active subject..., a participator and a collabo-
rator," but control would remain in the "head" of the corporate body often 
pictured in Fortune's advertisments (figure 5). The most apparent manifestation 
of this philosophy was the lack of bylines in Fortune: every bit of copy in the 
magazine seemed to come not from an individual, but from an institution. In 1937, 
Fortune printed its first justification of this policy, using the language of the 
corporate body: "Fortune speaks with its own corporative voice, not with an 
assortment of tenors and baritones from individual contributors . . . [I]t thinks of 
itself in unity." The column invoked a fantasy of corporate wholeness. The 
institution not only "speaks," but "thinks." The contributors, it would seem, 
agreed in all their thoughts and emotions about the magazine.32 
But as Macdonald recognized, the corporate body was not necessarily a 
happy home: "Like all machines, [Time, Inc.] is vastly impersonal." Fortune's 
writing staff was notoriously discontented at the magazine. The creative desires 
of the writers conflicted with editors' need to produce "objective," depersonalized 
copy. Like advertising copywriters, who fought briefly in the late twenties for 
bylines on their work, Fortune writers, according to Macdonald, had to sit quietly 
as "copy chiefs . . . performed major surgery on the writer's work, leaving 
truncated images... and mystified readers." In order for the corporation to work 
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TH 
NEXT 
STEP IN PUBLIC 
UTILITY SERVICE 
DURING the lost few years, America has watched with amazement the gigantic 
development of public utilities. The genera-
tion and transmission of electricity haï been 
multiplied to the great benefit of Industry 
and with an ever-increasing contribution to 
the efficiency, comfort, convenience and 
happiness of modern life. 
The centralization of electric generation, 
with ttt resulting economies and advantages 
to the public, is comparable to all utility 
services. We have .seen central pumping 
plant hundreds of thousands of individual • 
pumps and weiisi central electric stations 
and other individual systems for producing 
power and illumination; modern sewerage 
systems contribute to health and sanitation, 
and transportation utilities girdle the conti-
nent w&h speed and comfort. 
In pradicaBy wwy city and town, smok-
ing chimneys provide condemning evidence 
to the inefficiency of our. common heating 
practices. Thousands of tons of soot are 
distributed over our communities, soiling 
our beautiful buildings,* ruining our mer-
chandise and seriously affecting our,-
healtn. Monstrous coal and ash trucks 
add to our traffic congestion and thousands 
of individual fires set up a terrifying fire haz-
ard. A great need exists for public heating: 
In scores of American dries, the magic 
hand of Public Utifity Service is 
Ing that these conditions can be vastly Im-
proved by District Heating. Generating steam 
In efficient central boiler Plant* and distrib-
uting ft through well insulated underground 
mains to all of the buildings within a given 
district is the solution public utilities are offer-
ing to the age-old heating problem. Public 
heating plants are growing rapidly in. re-
sponse to public demand for service. 
Not only for heating purposes, but for pro-
cess work in industrial plants, enormous 
quantities of steam are required. Publie util-
ity executives, constantly on the lookout for 
opportunities to render profitable public 
service, are realizing that District Heating for 
business, residential and industrial sections is 
a field of utility service where the surface has 
onlybeenscWchod Hera nwyb^ discovered 
manifold opportunities' for, economies,. In-
creased incomes and magnified public 
With the widespread financial support the 
American public Is gMng to public utility 
enterprises, we may reasonably look for 
the same rapid expansion In pubOc 
steam service as we have observed in other fields of 
For more thon fifty yearsthe activities of the Amer-
. loan District Steam Company,have been closely attied 
with the development of District Heating. The experi-
ence gained through this dose association b avail-
able to utility executives and others Interested. 
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Figure 5: The corporate body at work. Advertisement for the American 
District Steam Company in the February 1930 issue of Fortune. Repro-
duced by permission of ADSCO Manufacturing LLC. 
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in unity, the individual—even if he considered himself an "artist"—was forced 
to suppress his personality. Ironically, while Luce borrowed the artistic idea of the 
creative genius for the tycoon, he denied it to the artists within his corporation. 
Only the creative work of the businessman could be acknowledged, and as 
Macdonald noted, financially rewarded. In the words of Buck-Morss, the "pseudo-
totality" of the corporate body, like Wagner' s phantasmagoria, hid "the alienation 
and fragmentation, the loneliness and sensual impoverishment of modern exist-
ence that was the material out of which it [was] composed." Luce's fantasy of a 
unified corporation fed off the alienation of the supposedly voracious "belly" of 
workers.33 
Luce's desire to control the economy through more dependable means than 
internal agreement also injured the worker through its tendency towards war. 
Luce expressed occasionally a profound and disturbing nostalgia for war. In 
1930, while looking for an "honorable" profession for talented young men, he 
mused on what war might mean to the United States: 
Peace, we say, has her victories no less than war. Has it? . . . If 
conquest were our united national ambition,... before every 
energetic Harvard man there could glitter the star of a 
proconsulship. How ridiculous this sounds. Yet to all the poets 
from Homer to Tennyson it would be astounding that it should 
sound ridiculous. 
War, for Luce, offered the possibility of honor and position. But the same 
blindness that did not allow Luce to see the masses in the workplace kept him from 
noticing the soldier in the trenches. There is irony in his pining for a war "of 
honor": the same technology that had in many ways allowed business to become 
a leader had created a form of war in which honor and position were beside the 
point. The fascists in Buck-Morss—the Futurists, primarily—aestheticized war 
by convincing the masses that the mass destruction they were observing did not 
involve their own bodies as the hyle. Luce's aestheticization of war involved a 
refusal to acknowledge that the destruction was mass. Like the businessman 
playing the game, Luce's soldier still seemed to be engaged in a mono a mono 
contest.34 
But there was more to Luce's movement toward war than nostalgia for 
honorable contest. Lewis Mumford in Technics and Civilization argued that war 
resulted when individuals and nations could "no longer stand the exacting strain 
of life in groups, with all the necessities for compromise, give-and-take, live-and-
let-live, understanding and sympathy that such life demands." Luce's frustration 
with the "irrationality" of the crowd lessened his capacity for "understanding and 
sympathy." The feminized consumer resisted attempts at rationalization; his own 
corporation always remained beyond his full control; even the business commu-
nity refused to accept rational and efficient leadership. Furthermore, the unlim-
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ited progress assumed by the game idea of business was being stifled by 
businessmen' s panic at the Crash of 1929 and by consumers who didn' t consume 
enough to keep the cycle going.35 
The "exacting strain" of living in a mass community runs through Luce's 
writings and speeches. In the opening of 'The American Century," Luce's 
famous 1941 essay arguing for a United States-led global imperialism and for 
intervention in the European war, he projected his discontent on his fellow 
citizens: "We Americans are unhappy. We are not happy about America. We are 
not happy about ourselves in relation to America. " Luce's dissatisfaction parallelled 
Ortega y Gasset's sense that Europe had sunk into "decadence" and atrophy 
because it had no long-term aim, no "higher purpose." In "The American 
Century," Luce tried to provide a "united national ambition" in the same 
expansionist and imperial terms as Ortega y Gasset's "gigantic continental 
State": the United States, he argued, must enter the war and emerge as the leader 
of a new global economy and culture. To escape his frustration with the seeming 
directionlessness of the United States, Luce fantasized about making "the nation 
stand up, stand up" or inspiring the "next general march for mankind," just as he 
believed Mussolini had done for Italy. Satisfaction and inspiration seemed to lie 
in a business-centered global society which offered both adventure and effi-
ciency, and allowed both competitive glory and scientifically-managed logic. He 
wished to force the crowd to follow his vision of business and aristocracy, and he 
wanted to pull the world along with him. Towards progress, towards imperialism, 
towards Italian fascism, and finally towards war.36 
Notes 
1. Robert Herzstein, Henry R. Luce (New York, 1994), 83; Introductory editorial note, 
Fortune 10.1 (1934), 45. 
2. Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 49, 97-101; Dwight Macdonald, "Time, Fortune, Life," The 
Nation 144.21 (1937), 586; Eric Hodgins, Trolley to the Moon (New York, 1973), 374; W.A. 
Swanberg, Luce and his Empire (New York, 1972), 70-73. 
3. Henry Luce, "The American Century," in John Jessup, éd., The Ideas of Henry Luce (New 
York, 1969), 119-20. 
4. Henry Luce, "Let it Die," in Jessup, Ideas, 91-4; "The State," Fortune 10.1 (1934), 48. 
5. Dwight Macdonald, "Time and Henry Luce," The Nation 144.18 (1937), 502. 
6. Any use of gendered language in this essay is intentional. The world of Henry Luce was a 
male-dominated one, and when he talked of businessmen, he generally meant just that. Certainly there 
were exceptions: Margaret Bourke-White, for example, was an honored member of staff. But the 
writers were exclusively male, and the business people that Fortune featured were almost all male as 
well. While Ï am not focusing on the gendered aspects of his sense of business here, this gender divide 
is important to the way Luce and his fellow businessmen understood their world. 
7. Henry Luce, "Aristocracy and Motives," in Jessup, Ideas, 96-101. 
8. "Daniel Cowan Jackling," Fortune 1.3 (1930), 72-75. 
9. Ibid., 72; Advertisement for Eagle-A Paper, Fortune 1.2 (1930), 115. In this essay, I use 
advertisements from Fortune and compare them to the business philosophy of Henry Luce. My 
justification for this seemingly simplistic equation is that I argue that Luce's ideas are mainstream in 
the business community, not just the individual musings of "hero-worshipper." The advertisements 
then are useful not only in summing up Luce's ideas (which I will explore with plenty of alternate 
sources), but more importantly in connecting Luce to this larger community. 
10. Advertisement for Fortune, Fortune 1.3 (1930), 137, quoted from the Boston Transcript, 
Letter to the editor, Fortune 1.2 (1930), 128; Walcott Gibbs, "Profiles," The New Yorker 12.5 (1936), 
20. 
Henry Luce, Fortune 139 
11. Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture (London, 1996), 50-61. 
12. Susan Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered," October 62 (1992), 3-41. In defining the use of hyle Buck-Morss explains, 
"Phenemenology uses the term hyle, undifferentiated, 'brute' matter—to describe that which is 
perceived but not 'intended.' [Edmund] Husserl's example is Durer's engraving on wood of the 
knight on horseback. Although the wood is perceived along with the knight's image, it is not the 
meaning of the perception. If you are asked, what do you see? you will say, a knight (i.e., the surface 
image), not a piece of wood. (28)" See also Walter Benjamin's "Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction," in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York, 1968), 217-251, especially the 
epilogue. This is the piece upon which Buck-Morss builds her essay. 
13. Swanberg, Luce, 71,73; Macdonald, "Fortune Magazine," The Nation 144.19 (1937), 530; 
Macdonald, "Time and Henry Luce," 502. 
14. Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics," 27-32. 
15. "Business Outlook," Business Week (November 2, 1929), 3. 
16. Untitled Portfolio, Fortune 1.3,77-81. Text is from notes on the photographer, 18. The issue 
of copyrights seems to further support my contention that Fortune highly valued its photographers as 
individual artists. Robert Capa and other founders of the photographer's cooperative Magnum 
organized after World War Two in order to wield more power at magazines such as Life, and copyright 
ownership was a central issue in their struggle. Historian Russell Miller argues that Magnum 
photographers' bid to own its copyrights was unprecedented. But the photographers at Fortune seem 
to have retained the copyright to the images used in the magazine during the thirties. While Life 
continues to own its photographs from the thirties, photographs published in Fortune are owned by 
the photographers (or their estates)—see, for example, the photograph credits from Life and Fortune 
photographs in Sean Callahan, éd., The Photographs of Margaret Bourke-White(Greenwich, Conn., 
1972). Unfortunately, I have been unable to confirm that Fortune policy provided photographers with 
their copyrights in the thirties. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that Fortune would have given up its 
copyrights to the photographs used in its pages in the sixty years since the decade ended. See Russell 
Miller, Magnum: Fifty Years at the Front Line of History (New York, 1997), 50-1.1 should thank here 
my anonymous reviewers from American Studies, one of whom suggested I look into this issue, and 
all of whom helped me make this a much better essay. 
17. Advertisement for Fortune, Fortune 1.3 (1930), 137, quoted from The Baltimore Sun. 
18. Ibid., 137, quoted from the New York Times. 
19. Henry Luce, "Address to the Commissars," in Jessup, Ideas, 41. 
20. See Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream (Berkeley, Calif., 1985), 64-69, 
for a discussion of the tendency of advertisers to characterize the consumer as feminine. 
21. "Model Women," Fortune 2.3 (1930), 89-92; "Cloak and Suit," Fortune 1.5 (1930), 92-
100. 
22. The three quoted phrases come from advertisements for three different advertising agen-
cies. In order: J. Walter Thompson Company, Fortune 2.1 (1930), 95; Cowan and Dengler, Fortune 
1.1 (1930), 47; and Dyer-Enzinger Company, Inc., Fortune 2.3 (1930), 27. For a discussion of the 
advertisers' contempt for consumers, see Marchand, Advertising the American Dream, 68. 
23. "Cloak and Suit," 100; "Burlesque Tyrant," Fortune 2.5 (1930), 59. 
24. Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics, 1920-35 (New York, 1994), 15. 
25. Robert Elson, Time Inc.: The Intimate History of a Publishing Enterprise, 1923-41 (New 
York, 1968), 130; "Markets," Fortune 1.1 (1930), 109; "Good Taste in Advertising," Fortune 1.2 
(1930), 60-1. 
26. For comments on Luce's "careful study" (Herzstein, 83) of Ortega y Gasset, see either 
Herzstein, Henry R Luce, or Swanberg, Luce. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New 
York, 1957), 170, 11,179, 15. 
27. Ortega y Gasset, Revolt, 17, 189. 
28. Ibid, 169. 
29. Henry Luce, "The Tycoon," in Jessup, Ideas, 222. 
30. Ortega y Gasset, Revolt, 122, 176; Elson, Time, Inc., 219. 
31. Quoted in Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics," 38. 
32. Luce, "Aristocracy and Motives," 100; Macdonald, "Time, Fortune, Life,"585', "Fortune's 
Wheel" (a regular unsigned column), Fortune 16:1 (1937), 36-7. 
33. Macdonald, "Time and Henry Luce," 501 ; Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance (New York, 
1994), 318-22 (see also Marchand, Advertising the American Dream 147); Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics 
and Anaesthetics," 26. 
34. Luce, "Aristocracy and Motives," 96. 
35. Lewis Mumford, Civilization and Technics (San Diego, 1963), 308. Originally published 
in 1934. 
36. Luce, "The American Century," 106. 
